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The interest in alternative dispute resolution is intensify-
ing in this country and others as well. Programs offering medi-
ation, arbitration, negotiation and conciliation services are
proliferating throughout the United States, Canada, Australia
and Western Europe. These programs may be court-related or
community-based. In either case, the overt justifications for
mediation programs are similar. Mediating conflict as a substi-
tute for litigating disputes has been justified by two basic ratio-
nales: First, the formal court system is not suited to handle the
range and number of disputes being brought to it. Second, the
adversary process itself is not suited to resolve interpersonal
disputes.'
While mediation is flourishing, concern about the theory
and practice of 'Informal" justice is also increasing.2 Most of
the criticisms focus on the manipulative potential of informal
systems such as mediation. For example, critics suggest the
bureaucratic logic that supports state legality is as much a part
of the process in informal and non-bureaucratic settings as it is
0 Janet Rindn is a graduate of New York University Law School She prac-
ticed as a criminal defense attorney with the Legal Aid Society in New York
City. Currently she is an associate professor in the Legal Studies Department
at the University of Massachusetts. She is the past ombudsperson for the uni-
versity and is the founder and director of the University Mediation Project.
1. See generally Daniel McGillis, Recent Developments in Minor Dispute
Processing. National Institute of Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
U.S. Department of Justice by ABT Associates under Contract No. JLEAA
81378.
2. It has been asked, for example, why informal systems purport to achieve
justice in an unjust society when formal institutions cannot. It has been ar-
gued that just as the image of formal law is enhanced by legal representation
and procedural protections, informal processes such as mediation use other
mechanisms to convey the image of equality without achieving substantive
equality. Critics further insist that compromise between unequals inevitably
reproduces inequality, and that mediation limits and ultimately represses con-
flict. See generally Richard Abel, The Politics of Informal Justice, Vols I and II
(1981).
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in the formal court of law. Critics also suggest that the state,
faced with fiscal crisis, achieves spending cuts by resorting to
informalization, accompanied by appeals to popular participa-
tion, consensual social life, and the struggle against bureau-
cracy.3 Others argue that mediation fosters the privatization of
life-the cult of the personal-and denies the existence of irrec-
oncilable structural conflicts between classes or between citi-
zen and state.4 Finally, critics claim that mediation is
detrimental to the interests of women, who, being less empow-
ered, need both the formal legal system and aggressive legal
representation to protect existing rights and pursue new legal
safeguards.5
Although these criticisms remain, the debate about media-
tion lacks a careful questioning of law and alternative dispute
programs from a feminist perspective. For the most part, medi-
ation's critics predicate their questions on the traditional view
of law that litigation leads to social change and that the "law-
suit" is the appropriate and most effective vehicle for challeng-
ing unfair social practices, for protecting individuals, and for
delineating new areas of guaranteed "rights."
This dominant view leaves unchallenged the patriarchal
paradigm of law as hierarchy, combat, and adversarialness;
and, therefore, generates only a certain kind of questioning of
mediation. This viewpoint has not asked whether and in what
way alternative dispute resolution reflects a feminist analysis
of law and conflict resolution, and whether in theory and prac-
tice mediation challenges or reinforces gender inequality in
contemporary society.
My intention in this discussion is to articulate some of the
questions basic to an understanding of the relationship be-
tween law, mediation and feminist inquiry.6 As one commenta-
3. Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law and Community. The Changing Nature
of State Power in Late Capitalism, 8 Int'l J. of the Soc. of L 379, 388-89 (1980).
4. Richard Abel, Conservative Conjfict and the Reproduction of Capitalism:
The Role of Informal Justice 9 Int'l J. of the Soc. of L. 245 (1981).
5. The National Conference on Women and the Law in Washington, D.C.(1983) (unpublished proceedings). Cf. Fran Olsen, The Family and the Market"
A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L Rev. 1497, 1542 (1983) (medi-
ation may be detrimental. women may need a more formal system).
6. This approach was chosen in part because the answers are unclear. Hav-
ing mediated numerous disputes and directed the University of Massachusetts
Mediation Project for the past two years, it is increasingly clear to the author
that these questions need to be made explicit.
The University of Massachusetts Mediation Project began operation in Feb-
ruary of 1981. To date, 90 mediators have been trained. The mediators repre-




10]bjective epistemology is the law of law. It ensures that
the law will most reinforce existing distributions of power
when it most closely adheres to its own highest ideal of
fairness.... Such law not only reflects a society in which
men rule women; it rules in a male way. The rule form
which unites scientific knowledge with state control in its
conception of what law is, institutionalizes the objective as
jurisprudence.7
What is not yet clearly developed is how mediation in the-
ory reflects "a new jurisprudence, a new relation between life
and law."8 Further, what is not yet known is whether in prac-
tice, mediating disputes reflects feminist jurisprudential differ-
ences from the male ideology of law or whether mediating
simply reinforces the "objective epistomology" 9 of law.
L Mediation in Theory: Feminist Pedagogy and the Study of Law
Social structures supporting the pedagogy practiced in
traditional American law schools conflict with the social struc-
tures espoused as the basis of mediation. In traditional legal
pedagogy, the case book is the emblem of the authoritative
character of the law and the "Socratic Method" mirrors and re-
inforces the structure of authority. Traditional legal pedagogy
is hierarchical with a vengeance.10 It trains students to reject
an analysis of social reality as it is subjectively experienced,
and instead requires them to internalize a series of abstract
rules.1l Traditional legal pedagogy is deeply wedded to a patri-
archal conception of law. This wedding is characterized by hi-
erarchy, adversarialness, linearity, and rationality, a paradigm
community members, and attorneys. Over 350 cases have been handled by the
project. Of those cases which have formally been mediated almost 80% have
successfully reached agreement The types of cases that have been mediated
include roommate problems, landlord/tenant conflicts, fraternity conflicts, sex-
ual harassment disputes, family disputes, consumer problems, and business
partnership disputes. The University Mediation Project is supported by the
University and a Massachusetts foundation. Disputes are referred to the pro-
ject from all parts of the University hierarchy, the local bar, clergy, the probate
and district courts, and the community, whose awareness of the project is
increasing.
7. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, MarxLm, Metho4 and the State: To-
ward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 635, 645 (1983).
8. Id. at 658.
9. Id. at 645.
10. Duncan Kennedy Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in The Poli-
tics of Law: A Progressive Critique 40-61 (David Kairys ed. 1982).
11. Meredith Gould, The Paradox of Teaching Feminism and Learning Law,




in which reason is synonymous with rule and the ideal of the
reasonable man is the fundamental frame of reference for mak-
ing decisions.12 Whereas formal law reinforces the dominance
of hierarchy and rationality supporting traditional ideas of pub-
lic and private,13 mediation challenges these notions. By ex-
plicitly asking different kinds of questions, by supporting
dialogue and by challenging the authority of "objective episte-
mology" implicit in the law and in legal teaching, a new
pedagogy emerges which is essential to a new way of thinking
about law. This new pedagogical approach, in a mediation
course, places the emphasis on the female concerns of respon-
sibility and justice. These concerns contrast with the concerns
for individual rights'4 that are characteristic of the male
pedagogy dominant in law school and most other academic
settings.
The study of mediation thus introduces and, indeed, re-
quires a feminist pedagogy, a feminist pedagogy fundamentally
different from traditional legal pedagogy.15 "IF] eminist method
is consciousness raising: the collective critical reconstitution of
the meaning of women's social experience as women live
through it."16
Legal pedagogy involves a learning process in which
"facts, issues, principles, reasoning and laws are learned with-
out specific reference to behavior or experience; where stu-
dents are required to think in legal terms and to articulate
problems and issues in the language of the law."'17 Legal
pedagogy reflects the power relationships which feminist the-
ory challenges. The study of mediation from a feminist per-
spective focuses on questions which are antithetical to
traditional legal study: Is liberal law and the rationalistic linear
mode of thinking, of which law study is a part, in some funda-
mental way male and distinguishable from female contextual
12. Janet Rifldn & Peter d'Errico, Response to Zillah Eisenstein, ALSA Forum:
A Journal of Interdisciplinary Legal Studies, issues 2 & 3 (combined issue)
(1983).
13. Jean Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political
Thought (1981).
14. See generally Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory
and Women's Development (1982).
15. See Marylyn Boxer, For and About Women: The Theory and Practice of
Women's Studies in the United States, 7 Signs 661 (1982).
16. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Marxism, Method and the State: An
Agenda for Theory in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology 29 (Nannerl Ke-
ohane, Michelle Rosaldo & Barbara Gelpi eds. 1982).
17. Gould, supra note 11.
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thinking?18 Do women have a distinct moral language empha-
sizing concern for others, responsibility, care, and obligation as
distinguished from male morality, which focuses on abstract
notions of individual rights?19 Do female and male engender-
ment generate different modes of thinking and discourse and is
it useful to distinguish between them?20
These questions not only exist outside the framework of
traditional legal teaching but also represent a challenge to the
way of thinking that supports the operation of law in this soci-
ety. Theoretically, at least, the study of mediation challenges
traditional pedagogy. This challenge and mediation's emphasis
on the female concerns of responsibility and justice necessitate
framing questions from a feminist perspective.
I. Mediation in Practice: Promise and Problems
Mediation in practice operates as a process of discussion,
clarification, and compromise aided by third party facilitators.
It is a process in which the third party has no state-enforced
power. A third party's power lies in the ability to persuade the
parties to reach a voluntary settlement. It involves the creation
of consensus between the parties in which the parties are
brought together in an atmosphere of confidentiality to dis-
cover shared social and moral values as a means of coming to
an agreement.2'
In mediation, the focus is not on formal and substantive
rights. The emphasis is on the process by which the individual
parties are encouraged to work out their own solution in a
spirit of compromise. The intervention of a mediator turns the
initial dyad of a dispute into a triadic interaction of some kind.
However, the disputing parties retain their ability to decide
whether or not to agree and accept proposals for an outcome ir-
respective of the source of the proposals.
The following chart highlights some of the main contrasts
between adjudication and the practice of mediation.22
18. MacKinnon, aupr note 16.
19. Gilligan. supr note 14.
20. Ann Freedman, (1983) (unpublished paper from the Conference on Criti-
cal Legal Studies at Rutgers University Law School in Camden, NJ.).
21. Conceptually, mediation and adjudication have nothing in common. The
first involves helping people to decide for themselves, the second involves help-
ing people by deciding for them. See P.IL Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations:
A Cross-Cultural Perspective 3-7 (1979).
22. See generally The Justice Motive in Social Behavior. Adapting to Times of






strict evidentiary rules no formal parameters--con-
versationalist
coercive voluntary
emphasis on conflict of in- emphasis on areas of agree-
terest, value dissensus ment, points in common
win/lose--combative compromise-conciliatory
decision oriented agreement oriented
rule oriented person oriented
professional decision maker community lay volunteers
representation by lawyer direct participation
Although the mediator is a neutral intervenor with no self-
interest, a mediator does become a negotiator. In that role the
mediator inevitably brings to the process, deliberately or not,
certain ideas, knowledge, and assumptions.2 3 What a mediator
can do is also affected by the particular context and the parties'
expectations of mediation.2 4
The question of a mediator's technique brings us back to
the issue of whether the methodology of mediation is premised
on the same view of objectivity inherent in legal ideology. If
neutrality, an important feature of being a mediator, masks the
same "objectivist" paradigm of law, then mediation, like legal-
ism, reinforces the ideology fundamental to the state as male
and further institutionalizes male power.25 In theory, media-
tion is fundamentally different from law in that law
aspires to science, to the immanent generalization sub-
suming the emergent particularity, to prediction and con-
trol of social regularities and regulations, preferably
codified. Courts intervene only in properly "factualized"
disputes.... The separation of form from substance, pro-
cess from policy, role from theory and practice echoes and
23. Gulliver, supra note 21, at 213.
24. Id. at 214.
25. Cf. MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 645.
Mnookin and Kornhauser note that "[ijn view of the critical role of lawyers
and the disparate functions they may perform, it is startling how little we know
about how they actually behave." Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bar-
gaining in the Shadow of the Law: 77he Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 987
(1979).
The question needs to be asked about the practice of law as well as the
practice of mediation. Do lawyers base their work on the "objectivist" episte-




re-echoes at each level of the regime its basic norm:
objectivity.26
The rhetoric of mediation rejects the "objectivist epistemology"
of the law. Theoretically, in mediation precedents, rules, and a
legalized conception of facts are not only irrelevant but con-
strain the mediator's job of helping the parties to reorient their
perception of the problem to the extent that an agreement can
be reached.2 7 The legal rights of the parties are not central to
the discussion which takes place in mediation. Again, in the-
ory, the lack of focus in mediation on abstract legal rights con-
trasts with the emphasis on them in legal proceedings.
These differences, however, are clearer in theory than in
practice. The following two case studies reflect this. They only
begin to fill the void in the literature on mediation. They pro-
vide a means through which questions about the practice of
mediation (in contrast to the theory of mediation and the prac-
tice of law), can be examined more accurately. Numerous
questions emerge from actually mediated disputes:
1) Does the mediation process substitute another form of
"objectivist" manipulation of conflict?
2) Does the mediation process really shift the focus of the
dispute from an abstract notion of right to the more female
concerns of care, responsibility, and concern for others?
3) Does mediation involve a new definition of justice?
4) What is the measure of whether these things or others
are happening in mediation? What kinds of questions need
to be asked of the participants in particular and of the pro-
cess in general?
5) Does mediation of a conflict alter the power relation-
ship between the parties? Does it redistribute that power
or does it perpetuate a relationship of inequality?
6) Does mediation, by requiring participation and decision
making by the parties, offer a better forum for resolving
problems in situations where traditionally women have
been particularly victimized?
Case Study 1: Separation and Divorce
The participants in this study were a man and woman who
wanted to separate after fifteen years of marriage. They had
three children aged six, eight, and ten. They had each retained
separate counsel but after legal negotiations had broken down
they decided to try mediation.
The woman came to the office first. The couple had agreed
26. MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 655-56.




to separate ten months before but still occupied the same
house. Relations were hostile and communication strained.
The woman said that her children were not speaking to her and
she felt that her husband was turning them against her. At the
initial interview the woman said that the atmosphere among
them--the lawyers, the children, and she and her husband-
was so hostile that resolution of their marital dispute appeared
impossible. She also indicated that she thought he needed
"help."
The husband's interview verified her description. His an-
ger and frustration were compounded because he had lost his
job and was moving out of town within a month. He wanted to
resolve the dispute before he moved. He also commented that
she needed "help."
The following is a summary of their concerns:
Custody: He wanted custody of the children.
She supported his having custody, but feared
that she might never see them again. During
the mediation she agreed to give him full
custody of the children once assured of ample
visitation rights.
Child
Support. He would "take care of his kids."
She was not in a position to support the
children.
Alimony:. He wasn't willing to give her alimony.
She was uncertain of her financial needs but
said that she wanted some financial help while
looking for a job. She agreed to no alimony.
Property: The financial settlement involved an extensive
and complex division of property. The main
asset was their house. She agreed to accept a
lump sum of money and twenty-five percent of
the net sale of the house over $80,000 in lieu of
alimony.
Their attitudes and relationship with their lawyers be-
came one of the most difficult and perhaps interesting aspects
of this case. Both of their attorneys initially agreed that media-
tion might be useful. The man stated that he planned to drop
his lawyer and represent himself in court if the mediation went
well. His lawyer offered to put any final mediation agreement
into legal language for presentation to the court. In the end,
the man represented himself with his attorney's approval.
The woman came to the project with conflicting feelings
[Vol. 2"21
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about her lawyer. Although aware that she might gain
financially with a formal, contested divorce, she feared the pro-
cess could irreparably damage her relationship with her chil-
dren. The case coordinator initially advised her to talk with her
attorney about using mediation. She did so and her attorney
agreed, with some reservations about her ability to protect her
own interests. As the mediation proceeded, she was advised
several times to consult with her attorney but the case coordi-
nator suspected that she was not doing so.
In the end, her attorney rejected the final mediation agree-
ment and told her it was impossible for him to represent her if
she insisted on keeping the agreement as the divorce settle-
ment. She chose to discontinue the relationship with her attor-
ney and she, like her husband, represented herself in the court
proceedings. Her attorney was very upset and told the judge in
her presence that he objected to her mediated settlement. The
judge accepted the agreement after speaking with her at
length.
Case Study 2. Sexual Harassment
A twenty-five year old undergraduate woman was very
troubled about what she described as sexual harassment by
one of her professors. She claimed that he had made many in-
appropriate inquiries in class about the backgrounds of the wo-
men students, wanting to know about their boyfriends, their
parties, and other similar matters. During a conversation with
him regarding a research assistantship, he offered to drive her
home. She consented to this and on the way, they stopped for
a drink. During their conversation she learned the position
would involve working closely with him. The conversation led
to a discussion of personal matters and he told her of his un-
happy marriage. Later on he mentioned that he was very at-
tracted to her and would like to go to bed with her. She felt
extremely uneasy and said that she would have to think about
it.
The next day she went to his office and rejected his sexual
proposal. He said that he was disappointed. Two weeks passed
without any mention of the job. When she finally approached
him, he told her the position was no longer available. She was
upset and went to the department chair, who recommended
that she consider mediation. She also spoke to the school's
dean, who initially reacted with disbelief, but later believed the
student after speaking to the professor. The dean told them
19841
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both that he wanted the dispute worked out in mediation, but
indicated that if he received another complaint he would dis-
miss the faculty member.
In a lengthy meeting with the mediation staff, the student
learned that she could arrange for a more formal, potentially
punitive process by requesting the administration to form an
ad hoc hearing committee. She considered this alternative but
requested mediation, claiming she did not want the professor
fired. The professor also agreed to mediation.
During a four hour mediation session with the two parties,
the student explained why the incident was so upsetting. The
professor responded with tears and an apology. At the end of
the mediation, they shook hands and both expressed satisfac-
tion to the mediator. She said she mostly wanted the opportu-
nity to make him hear her point of view. He said he
understood and expressed appreciation at being spared the hu-
miliation of a more public proceeding. She also expressed her
relief at being able to avoid the pain of a public and more for-
malized hearing where her credibility might be subject to re-
view and cross-examination. At the end of the mediation he
apologized and offered her a job, which she rejected. He also
promised not to penalize her by lowering her grade.
Summary
Although critics of mediation charge that it may keep the
less powerful party from achieving equality and equal bargain-
ing power,2 8 it is not so clear from these case studies how this
operates in practice. These objections to mediation are inextri-
cably tied to the view that the formal legal system offers both a
better alternative and a greater possibility of achieving a fair
and just resolution to the conflict. The general assumption that
the lawyer can "help" the client more meaningfully than a me-
diator is part of the problem with this view. In many instances,
although new substantive rights or legal protections are reai.
ized, patterns of domination are reinforced by the lawyer-client
relationship, in which the client is a passive recipient of the
lawyer's expertise. This is particularly true for women clients,
for whom patterns of domination are at the heart of the
problem.
In both case studies, it can be argued that the pattern of
dominance was affected. "Dominance produces a hierarchical
28. Olsen, supra note 5.
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arr4agement of the partners, which is reflected in differences in
such aspects of the relationship as freedom of movement, the
utilization of resources, and rights and responsibilities."29 In
these situations, the women felt that the relationship of domi-
nance had been altered and the hierarchy in the relationship
had to some extent been altered. A transformation of the pat-
tern of dominance will affect the power relationship as well.
Although mediation programs are proliferating, 30 many
questions remain. Why is the interest in alternatives intensify-
ing? What kinds of disputes are best suited to mediation? Who
should be mediators-lay persons, lawyers, or other profession-
als? What kind of training should mediators receive? Can me-
diation in practice alter the patterns of gender inequality in our
society more effectively than formal law? Can the teaching of
mediation begin to change and challenge the traditional ap-
proach to legal study? The answers to these questions may re-
main unclear, but if these issues are not addressed, mediation
will simply become another popular "technique" marketed as a
panacea for a range of complex social problems.
29. Ted Huston, Power, in Close Relationships 170 (Harold Kelley, et aL 1983).
30. There are currently over 200 programs in the U.S. See American Bar Asso-
ciation Special Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Dispute Resolu-
tion Quarterly Information Update.
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